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Facilitating Incomplete 
Contracts 
Wendy Netter Epstein† 
Abstract 
Contract law abhors incompleteness. Although no contract can be 
entirely complete, the idea of a purposefully incomplete or underspe-
cified contract is antithetical to lawyers’ ideals of certainty for the 
parties and for the law. Indeed, contract law is designed to incentivize 
parties to specifically articulate their intentions. Yet there is a 
growing body of interdisciplinary work in economics and cognitive 
psychology demonstrating that highly specified contracts tend to stifle 
intrinsic motivation and innovation, whereas less-specified contracts—
particularly in public-private contracting, IP, and contracting for 
innovation—can induce higher effort levels and a more cooperative 
principal–agent relationship than the traditional approach. Neverthe-
less, there remain both entrenched doctrinal and sociolegal deterrents 
to drafting less-specified contracts.  
This Article argues that the existing doctrinal roadblocks to 
incomplete contracts are out of step with the normative goals of 
commercial contracting—promoting efficiency and incentivizing com-
mercial activity. The indefiniteness doctrine and current approaches 
to contract interpretation, for instance, over-deter the use of 
incomplete contracting even when it would be efficient. Ultimately, 
this Article suggests a new doctrinal approach for those contracts 
where the law should incentivize incomplete contracting, borrowing 
from principles of constitutional interpretation: dynamic contextualist 
interpretation. Courts should look not only to party intent at the 
moment when the contract was formed but should consider how 
intentions developed during contract performance. Rather than pun-
ishing incompleteness, flexibility should guide determinations of 
validity and questions of interpretation. 
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Introduction 
Legal certainty is a central principle for the rule of law. Contract 
doctrine illustrates the centrality of that principle perhaps more than 
any other legal field.1 In the ideal depiction of contracting, two parties 
negotiate an agreement prior to undertaking performance obligations. 
Once both parties have consented to the terms of an agreement and 
have entered into a contract, then the parties perform their 
obligations because it is in their rational self-interest to do so; 
otherwise, no contract would have been signed in the first place. If 
one party absconds and does not meet his contractual obligation, a 
court can easily determine breach and damages because the terms of 
the parties’ deal were clear and certain. 
In this contracting ideal, compliance is the goal. Parties want to 
be certain that they will get what they contracted for, or at least that  
1. See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in 
Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 Yale L.J. 
848, 882 (2010) (“Uncertainty is generally regarded as being antithetical 
to efficient business decisionmaking.”). 
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they will be otherwise compensated for a breach. Certainty is the 
reason parties formally contract rather than informally agree. And it 
is easy to understand why “[o]ne of the core principles of contract law 
is the requirement of definiteness.”2 In this model, incomplete con-
tracts that fail to give adequate guidance to the parties about their 
duties and obligations are more likely to result in opportunistic beha-
vior and litigation and make litigation more time consuming and 
costly if it does result. Thus, lawyers are taught to avoid these 
drafting pitfalls.3  
Even more importantly, courts punish parties who either care-
lessly or purposefully draft incomplete contracts.4 These parties cause 
systemic costs in litigation that, in the traditional view, could have 
and should have been easily avoided by better drafting.5 A simple 
sales contract illustrates. Consider a buyer who agrees to purchase 
one hundred widgets for five dollars per widget in a one-time 
transaction. The parties negotiate these terms before any obligations 
accrue and detail the terms in a written contract. If the buyer receives 
the widgets but does not pay the seller $500, the questions of breach 
and damages are entirely straightforward.  
But now consider a second contract. Here, one firm partners with 
another to co-develop new technology, utilizing the strengths of both 
 
2. Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1643 (2003). 
3. Almost any contract drafting text would provide relevant examples. See, 
e.g., Tina L. Stark, Drafting Contracts: How and Why 
Lawyers Do What They Do 19–21 (2007). Searches of the Internet 
also reveal innumerable sources of advice for transactional law-
yers decrying ambiguity and incompleteness. E.g., Gonzaga Univer-
sity School of Law, Transactional Skills and Professionalism 
Lab 19–21 (2011), available at http://macomberlaw.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/01/Transactional-Lab-Course-Materials-20121.pdf (“Am-
biguity is never acceptable. It is the enemy of every drafter.”). 
4. See, e.g., Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying Cerberus in 
the Interpretation of Contractual Inconsistencies, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
71, 71–79 (2009) (discussing United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, 
Inc., 937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007) and noting the court’s “message to 
lawyers that they have a professional and ethical obligation to draft 
contracts clearly”); Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at 877 (noting the 
Delaware Chancery Court opinion in In re IBP as an example of a court 
encouraging precise language (citing In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation, 789 A.2d 14, 66 (Del. Ch. 2001))).  
5. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded 
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied 
Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 268–71, 311 (1985) (arguing 
that incompleteness and ambiguity are “formulation errors” and that 
the law should provide incentives for the reduction of such errors); see 
also Duhl, supra note 4, at 77 (arguing that “courts should discourage 
lawyers from drafting intentionally ambiguous contracts”).  
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entities to build a product that is not yet fully conceived. After 
development, the parties intend for the product to be jointly mar-
keted and sold worldwide. In this second contract, compliance still 
matters—a party that makes a relationship-specific investment does 
not want the other pulling out of the deal—but so do coordination, 
collaboration, and innovation. By contracting, the parties need to 
mitigate risk and facilitate coordination, all against a backdrop of 
complexity and uncertainty. 
Perhaps the parties could accomplish these goals by drafting a 
highly detailed contract with extensive control provisions to try to 
prevent opportunistic behavior.6 This is the strategy the law prefers.7 
But it is not only difficult and costly to accomplish, it may also not 
be the best or most efficient strategy in certain contexts. Recent 
interdisciplinary scholarship in economics, psychology, and the law 
has found that specificity, financial incentives, and control provisions, 
in general, can signal mistrust and crowd out parties’ intrinsic 
motivation to perform.8 Control-based contracting can give the 
impression that the principal is trying to constrain the agent and does 
not trust the agent to implicitly deliver skillful or consummate 
performance.9 Agents respond reciprocally to this sort of treatment. 
An agent who perceives being treated unfairly will in turn react 
negatively.  
In addition, contracts that are highly specified can create cog-
nitive problems. Agents will often adhere to the strict requirements 
specified in the contract at the sacrifice of furthering the main 
objective of the deal.10 Agents do not think for themselves; they 
merely do what is required.  
On the flip side, more flexible contracting has been shown to 
mitigate these problems. Less-complete contracts that rely on trust 
and reciprocity rather than control can induce higher effort levels and 
a more cooperative principal–agent relationship than the traditional 
approach. They also mitigate the cognitive problems identified in 
 
6. Control provisions include monitoring and reporting requirements or 
incentive-based compensation. 
7. Indeed, if the contract is not specific enough, it may be deemed void by 
the indefiniteness doctrine or may be construed against the drafter if it 
is too vague. See infra Part II.A. 
8. See infra Part I.B. 
9. There are many contracts where compliance or perfunctory performance 
is all that is necessary or desired. This Article, however, focuses on 
contracts where the principal seeks a higher level of performance from 
the agent or the parties working together must deliver consummate 
performance. 
10. These effects are well documented but not well settled. Some of the 
conflicting data are addressed infra Part I.B. 
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highly detailed contracts. For both behavioral and cognitive reasons, 
detailed, highly certain contracts may actually lead to greater 
inefficiency and an increased likelihood of litigation than more 
incomplete ones.11  
Despite much scholarship now suggesting a more flexible 
contracting approach, however, lengthy and complicated contracts 
filled with boilerplate and specific financial incentives continue to be 
commonplace in commercial transactions. This Article explores why 
incomplete contracting has not taken hold more widely despite its 
promise. It suggests that the theory is sound. But the law does not 
embrace the theory. Contract law assumes that incomplete contracts 
are always undesirable and should always be deterred. Contract 
doctrine actively disincentivizes parties from writing incomplete, 
flexible contracts, even when they might be efficiently employed.  
This is most obvious in contract law’s (renewed) preference for 
formalist interpretation in contracts between sophisticated entities. 
Formalist courts prioritize the four corners of the written agreement 
when confronted with interpretation questions, incentivizing parties to 
draft more complete contracts ex ante. Even contextualist inter-
pretation is somewhat unfriendly to incomplete contracts. Context-
ualist courts look to evidence outside the contract in an attempt to 
discern the intent of the parties at contract execution. For the most 
part, though, they ignore the evolution of the relationship post 
signing—an integral aspect to the success of flexible contracting.12  
If the normative goal of contract doctrine is to incentivize 
commercial activity and efficient dealmaking, the doctrinal approach 
deriding incompleteness is out of step with the goal. This Article 
suggests instead an approach to contract interpretation that borrows 
from principles of constitutional interpretation: dynamic contextualist 
interpretation. Given that less-specified contracts may be efficient, 
particularly in a variety of commercial contexts, courts reviewing such 
contracts should treat them more flexibly and liberally. Courts should 
account for the nature of flexible contracting—that not all decisions 
will be made before contract execution. Deals may evolve over time. 
Indeed, this may be the most efficient approach. The law assumes 
 
11. Michal Shur-Ofry & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Constructive Ambiguity: IP 
Licenses as a Case Study, Univ. Mich. J. L. Reform (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 18–20), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2430638## (suggesting that ambiguous contracts 
decrease the prospects of litigation in certain circumstances). 
12. In addition, under the Indefiniteness Doctrine, courts will not enforce 
contracts that are too vague. Canons of construction such as contra 
proferentem (construe against the drafter) also penalize parties choosing 
to leave contracts less detailed. Professional and commercial norms also 
deter parties and their lawyers from drafting less-specified contracts. See 
infra Part II.B. 
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that contracts are static and focuses on the agreement between the 
parties at execution. But many contracts are not static. They are 
dynamic, and their meaning evolves as the parties’ relationship 
evolves. Contract doctrine should match this reality. This Article 
begins to explore how and when that could be accomplished. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I rejects the traditional 
assumption that “good” contracts are necessarily detailed and 
specific. It reviews the growing interdisciplinary body of work 
suggesting that for both economic and behavioral reasons, commercial 
parties writing less-specified contracts ex ante might engender better 
contracting results ex post. Part II describes why few parties 
nonetheless take advantage of more flexible contracting forms that 
might be more efficient. It describes how lawyers are actively 
disincentivized from writing incomplete contracts by exploring both 
the doctrinal and sociolegal deterrents to these cooperative methods of 
contracting. Part III sets out the normative argument. It suggests 
that contract doctrine creates drafting incentives for transacting 
parties and that the current matrix is creating the wrong incentives. 
The right incentives should support commercial activity and generate 
efficient outcomes. Thus, doctrine should be reformed to better reflect 
and support these new models of contracting. Finally, Part IV begins 
to discuss how contract doctrine might be reformed for a particular 
class of contracts. Courts reviewing purposely relational contracts 
should not only treat them more flexibly and liberally but should take 
a dynamic and contextual approach to matters of interpretation. 
Contracts may have been static and unchanging in the traditional 
model, but these new forms of purposefully incomplete contracts are 
dynamic and evolving, and the law should follow suit. 
I. Flexible Contracting Can Be Efficient 
The law’s standard assumption is that more complete and 
unambiguous contracts are better.13 But there is a growing body of 
 
13. There are myriad current advocates of detailed contracting, as well. For 
examples in the public-private contracting context, see, for example, 
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1351 (2003) (noting that “there might be consi-
derable agreement between the economic and public law views about the 
importance of clear and enforceable contractual terms to the success of 
privatization”); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Public Owner-
ship: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships, 113 
Econ. J. C70 (2003) (noting the prevailing sentiment about government 
contracting that “any goals—economic or otherwise—can be achieved 
via a detailed initial contract”); Developments in the Law: The Law of 
Prisons: III. A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability 
in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1887 (2002) (“[T]here is no 
substitute for performance contracts that encourage quality improve-
ments, effective monitoring, and information gathering and disclosure.”). 
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work that demonstrates the pitfalls of highly specified, control-based 
contracting. This suggests the merits of less specification and more 
flexibility. Arguments for purposefully less-specified contracts run the 
gamut from traditional economic arguments centering on transaction 
cost savings to newer behavioral science research about reciprocity 
and intrinsic motivation. This Part explores the scholarship on 
incomplete contracts and suggests that at least where certain deal 
characteristics are present, less specification and more flexibility 
might lead to more efficient results than the alternative.14 
But first, a clarification about scope. The term “incomplete 
contracts” covers a lot of ground in the literature. A contract may be 
incomplete because of a failure to agree or because of a measured 
decision to leave terms open for later discussion.15 A contract may 
also be incomplete in the sense that parties cannot foresee all possible 
future states or address all possible contingencies.16 Indeed, no 
contract can ever anticipate all future states of the world; hence, in 
this sense, all contracts are incomplete.17 Even other contracts are 
incomplete because the parties choose vague, standard-like conditions 
when they could have input specific, verifiable conditions.18 Finally, a 
 
For an example in corporate acquisitions, see Choi & Triantis, supra 
note 1, at 880 (“[T]he existing case law on MAC clauses suggests that 
they should be drafted not only with specificity, but with quantifiable 
and easily determined monetary thresholds or descriptions of triggering 
events.”). 
14. This Article does not argue that no parties should ever make the 
decision to highly specify their agreement and ask the court for a 
formalist interpretation if disputes arise. Rather, the argument is more 
nuanced—that certain types of agreements benefit from less-specified 
drafting and that the law should account for that reality. 
15. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, I Farnsworth on Contracts 
§ 3.27 (2d ed. 1998). Depending on the degree of the failure to agree, 
these contracts may be void because of lack of mutual assent, not just 
indefiniteness.  
16. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92 n.29 (1989) 
(“A contract may also be incomplete in that it is insensitive to relevant 
future contingencies.”). A third reason for a contract’s incompleteness is 
that parties may consciously choose not to address possible future states 
because of costs associated with doing so. In such situations, it is 
possible to instead write contracts that define governance structures to 
deal with contingencies not addressed ex ante. 
17. Scott, supra note 2, at 1641. (“All contracts are incomplete. There are 
infinite states of the world and the capacities of contracting parties to 
condition their future performance on each possible state are finite.”).  
18. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in 
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 818 (2006) (examining the choice 
to use vague terms when precise provisions could have been employed); 
Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at 879 (considering the use of standards 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
Facilitating Incomplete Contracts 
304 
contract can be incomplete if it fails to make use of control options 
such as monitoring and reporting requirements or incentive-based 
compensation.19 
All contracts can be plotted on a multidimensional spectrum that 
accounts for these characteristics. One axis would cover specification 
of tasks. A contract that details every step an agent must take to 
comply with the contract falls at one end, and a contract that simply 
asks the agent to do the task without further direction marks the 
other end. A second axis would cover the extent of ex ante agreement 
to terms. One end would be a contract that tries to anticipate every 
issue on which the parties must agree and details these decisions in 
the contract. The other end would be a contract that leaves many 
decisions for future negotiation. A third axis would be control rights, 
with strong control measures at one end and no control measures at 
the other. This Article uses the term “incomplete contracts” in a 
purposely broad sense to mean contracts that fall in the more 
incomplete section of this three-dimensional spectrum.20 The parties 
might choose not to outline tasks in significant detail when it was 
possible to do so, use more standard-like language rather than rule-
like language, leave terms for future negotiation, and/or choose not to 
assert control rights like monitoring or audit rights.21 This Article 
focuses in particular on contracts that are incomplete as a strategic 
choice—bracketing the issue of incompleteness that results from 
merely careless or lazy drafting.22  
 
like best efforts rather than specific metrics); Scott, supra note 2, at 
1642 (discussing deliberately incomplete contracts that decline to 
condition performance on specific, verifiable measures); Duhl, supra note 
4, at 84 (considering ambiguity in best efforts standards). 
19. See generally George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business 
Outsourcing Transactions, 96 VA. L. REV. 241, 263–64 (2010) (listing 
different types of control options); George S. Geis, The Space Between 
the Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 110–14 (2009) 
(discussing agency cost problems in contracting). 
20. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 997, 999 (1992) (“In economic parlance, the term 
‘incomplete contract’ describes any contract short of the ideal of a 
complete contingent contract . . . .”). Importantly, however, for this 
Article, the term “incomplete contracts” does not allude to deals 
entirely lacking in detail—just a sense that contracts might be more 
successful if moved further from the most detailed endpoint on the 
spectrum. 
21. A common characteristic of all of these types of incompleteness or 
vagueness is that the parties leave broad interpretive discretion to the 
court if litigation results. See infra Part II for further discussion. 
22. See, e.g., Duhl, supra note 4, at 76 n.29 (“Of course, sloppiness is 
another cause of ambiguous drafting.”). 
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The next Sections explore the economic and behavioral arguments 
in favor of purposefully incomplete or flexible contracts and the 
contexts in which those strategies might be particularly efficient. 
A. Economic Approach to Incomplete Contracts 
The economic approach to contracting assumes that parties will 
contract only when the value of the exchanged performance to the 
buyer exceeds the cost of performance to the seller. Rational parties 
enter into a transaction only if it makes them both better off.23 
For law and economics scholars, the question of contract drafting 
strategy turns on costs: drafting costs, performance costs, and 
litigation costs, to be specific. Parties will draft contracts that 
minimize the sum of the costs likely to be incurred at these three 
stages. In general, ex ante specification is thought warranted to the 
degree that expected litigation costs24 and performance costs incurred 
as a result of lack of specificity are higher than the cost of drafting.25  
Transaction costs associated with drafting choices vary greatly 
from deal to deal. Less-complicated, shorter-term deals tend to be 
easier and less costly to detail ex ante. Drafting costs are also affected 
by levels of future uncertainty; in general, the lower the levels of 
uncertainty, the easier it is to draft a complete contract.26 In addition, 
variables such as frequency of related transactions affect cost. 
Economies of scale can decrease per transaction drafting costs.27 
How to measure or predict transaction costs is the source of 
fervent scholarly debate. To the extent that drafting, and even 
detailed drafting, is far less costly than litigation (accounting for the 
probability that litigation will result), it makes sense to write detailed 
contracts.28 Judge Richard Posner is a prominent supporter of ex ante 
 
23. E.g., Robert E. Scott, The Law and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 
2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279, 280 (2006) (“The economic approach 
begins with the assumption that parties act rationally, within the 
constraints of their environment, in the sense that they wish to contract 
if they believe the arrangement will make them better off and not 
otherwise.”). 
24. The idea of litigation costs should account for the probability that 
litigation will result. 
25. See Scott, supra note 23, at 280.  
26. See Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the 
New Formalism, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 18–19 (2009) (noting the 
grain industry as an example of a low uncertainty industry (citing Lisa 
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 
(1996))). 
27. Id. 
28. See, e.g., Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of 
Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine 
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contract specification. He suggests that pre-performance specification 
generally decreases the chance that a party will act opportunistically 
during contract performance and that the deal will result in 
litigation.29 In his view, parties are more likely to work out disputes 
before litigation if a contract is detailed and specific, as well.30 This 
makes detailed drafting efficient despite the transaction costs inherent 
in its undertaking.31  
In the traditional view, detailed drafting also increases the 
certainty that the judiciary will get it right should litigation result. Or 
a different spin on the argument is, if the parties have better 
information, it is more efficient for the parties to make decisions—and 
more likely they will get it right—than to ask a court to make the 
decision in litigation.32 Generally, “[i]n the economic analysis of 
contracts, the benchmark for contract design (the first-best) is the 
complete contingent contract that specifies the obligations of the 
parties in each possible future state of the world.”33 
But not all economists tout the virtues of specific and complete 
contracting, at least not for all deals. It is fairly uncontroversial that 
 
Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECON. 126, 135 (1993) (noting that parties 
incorporate the potential for future disputes into their contracting).  
29. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2005). This presumption is challenged 
by the findings of the behavioral literature. See infra Part I.B. 
30. Id. at 1614 (“When a dispute over the contract’s meaning arises, the 
parties will first try to resolve it themselves. They will do this not only 
because of the costs of litigation, but also because of the reputation 
factor that I discussed earlier: the party demonstrably in the wrong on 
the interpretive issue will hesitate to force the issue to litigation; he is 
likely to lose and in any event may acquire a reputation as someone who 
does not honor his commitments. The more carefully drafted the 
contract is, the easier it will be for the parties to resolve a dispute over 
its meaning when the dispute first arises, in other words at the 
prelitigation stage.”). The next Section will explore the experimental 
literature that challenges this assumption. 
31. Posner also suggests, disapprovingly, that “[d]eliberate ambiguity may 
be a necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be 
unable to agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances on 
being able to resolve them, with or without judicial intervention, should 
the need arise.” Id. at 1583; see also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, 
Models, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 987, 1009 
(2012) (noting that parties sometimes use “negotiated ambiguities” to 
close the deal). 
32. See, e.g., Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at 851–52 (noting that 
“courts . . . are usually less informed the than parties themselves,” 
raising the “prospect of costly judicial error on the back end”). 
33. George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A 
Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. 
REV. 1065, 1068 (2002). 
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a level of incompleteness is preferable where the cost of detailed 
up-front drafting exceeds expected gains. As in the technology 
co-development contract described above, it can be costly to draft 
specific contracts for complex deals against a backdrop of much 
uncertainty.34 In a traditional cost-benefit analysis, then, the more 
complicated the deal and the more uncertainty that exists, the more 
likely it is that ex ante detailing does not make sense.35 This is 
particularly true if lack of specificity does not mean higher likelihood 
of litigation.36  
Others have pointed to the unlikeliness of the decision to litigate 
over a large commercial transaction as an argument for less-specified 
drafting. Making the choice to sue is contrary to commercial norms.37 
It is costly and can invoke reputational sanctions in dealings with 
other parties.38 Renegotiation is a more likely result. Against that 
backdrop, detailed ex ante contracting done to decrease the likelihood 
of litigation or to make litigation less costly makes even less sense.  
Still other scholars have pointed to another virtue of incom-
pleteness or vagueness in drafting: because contractual incompleteness 
increases the cost of litigation for both parties,39 it makes it less likely  
34. Id. at 1071; see also B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 
Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902, 
903 (1998) (discussing cases where ambiguity is “often optimal”); Gillian 
K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete 
Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159 (1984) (noting that definite 
terms may be “infeasible”). 
35. See Badawi, supra note 26, at 33 (“[C]ontracts governing infrequent 
transactions are likely to be more incomplete. This relative incomplete-
ness follows from the higher cost of negotiating additional terms.”). 
36. This is one of the main advances from the behavioral literature 
discussed in Part I.B. The long held assumption that lack of specificity 
means a worse contracting relationship is not true—at least in certain 
contexts. See also Shur-Ofry & Tur-Sinai, supra note 11 (manuscript at 
13) (“More important for our purposes, even if ambiguous contracts 
entail higher litigation costs when litigation actually takes place, there is 
no evidence of a correlation between the level of ambiguity in a contract 
and the prospects of such litigation. In fact, our analysis below 
demonstrates that a certain level of ambiguity can actually improve the 
contract’s capability to serve the parties over time and increase the ro-
bustness of their transaction, which in turn may decrease the prospects 
of litigation.”). 
37. Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms 
Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 212–16 
(2009) (discussing the anti-litigation norm). 
38. Id. 
39. See infra Part II.A. In brief, where a contract is complete and unambig-
uous, a court can resolve allegations of breach as a matter of law. Where 
there is incompleteness or ambiguity, a court will allow in extrinsic 
evidence, which can vastly increase the cost of litigation. 
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that the parties will choose to litigate.40 In a recent article, Albert 
Choi and George Triantis used the corporate acquisitions context to 
illustrate this point.41 They found that because both parties would 
bear considerable risk and cost in litigation, litigation is actually less 
likely to occur where the contract is incomplete.42 Thus, more flexible 
and less-specified drafting may enhance rather than diminish the 
efficiency of a deal. 
The behavioral evidence explored in the next Section further 
broadens the scope of efficient incomplete contracts.  
B. Behavioral Evidence Touting Incompleteness 
The prior Section discussed the standard law and economics 
approach to incomplete contracts. In the simplest description, 
incomplete contracts are most likely to be efficient when ex ante 
drafting costs are high either because the transaction is very complex 
or future states of the world are very uncertain. 
But it is now well established that individuals’ behavior some-
times deviates from the predictions of self-interest and rationality. 
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky,43 Richard Thaler,44 and others first 
described a variety of contract relevant behavioral anomalies almost 
thirty years ago. This Section explores the importance of these 
behavioral anomalies to incomplete contracting. 
1. Experimental and Observational Work 
Both experimental and observational research have started to 
define the limits of the assumption that individuals act solely to 
further their own self-interests. For instance, experiments have shown 
that a significant portion of the population tends to return kindness 
with kindness, even when it is not in an individual’s rational self-
interest to do so.45 This is termed the reciprocity norm. Experiments 
 
40. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the 
Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 507 (2008). 
41. Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at 856 (arguing that “vague terms may 
do a better job than precise terms in promoting the goals of contract 
design”).  
42. Id. at 854–55. 
43. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981). 
44. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer 
Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980). 
45. Scott, supra note 2, at 1644 (noting experimental results that a 
significant fraction of individuals are motivated by reciprocity rather 
than self-interest). 
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have also found that autonomy boosts intrinsic motivation whereas 
control can signal distrust and crowd out intrinsic motivation to 
perform.46 
Rather than viewing incompleteness only as a cost in the overall 
equation, this scholarship explores incompleteness as a potential 
value-enhancing characteristic that can make a contract more 
efficient. Incompleteness can be a net positive in two general ways. 
First, it can prompt feelings of trust and reciprocity, whereas a more 
specific contract can dampen the agents’ morale and crowd out 
intrinsic motivation.47 Second, highly detailed contracts can have 
negative cognitive implications: a detailed contract encourages agents 
to comply precisely with what is specified to the detriment of imple-
menting the larger purpose of the transaction.48 Whereas contracts are 
sometimes thought of primarily as vehicles to provide legal rights for 
state enforcement or to spell out requirements for parties for compli-
ance purposes, this research describes how contracts can serve a sig-
naling function. What the contract says can actually change the 
parties’ approach to performance.  
There is now robust experimental literature addressing these 
issues. The first relevant experiments studied the question of whether 
contract content affects party behavior. The studies found that 
certain positive social norms can be cultivated through changing 
contract design.49 For example, one study compared the effect of 
 
46. See Chou et al., The Devil Is in the Details: Less Specific Contracts 
Promote Feelings of Autonomy, Intrinsic Motivation and Work 
Persistence 5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also 
Edward L. Deci et al., Facilitating Internalization: The Self-
Determination Theory Perspective, 62 J. PERSONALITY 119, 122 (1994); 
Wendy S. Grolnick & Richard M. Ryan, Parent Styles Associated with 
Children’s Self-Regulation and Competence in School, 81 J. EDUC. 
PSYCHOL. 143, 144 (1989); Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-
Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, 
Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 70 
(2000). 
47. Some have also hypothesized that an insistence on specificity can be a 
signal of anticipating future litigation.  
48. See, e.g., Robert Gibbons & Rebecca Henderson, What Do Managers 
Do? Exploring Persistent Performance Differences Among Seemingly 
Similar Enterprises, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 
680–731 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2013); see also Triantis, 
supra note 33, at 1072 (noting that conditioning reward on specified 
tasks distorts efforts to those tasks and away from ones the agent might 
otherwise have undertaken). 
49. See Anastasia Danilov & Dirk Sliwka, Can Contracts Signal Social 
Norms? Experimental Evidence 3 (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 7477, 
2013) (“[C]ontract choices may signal information about the actions of 
other agents and thus create indirect effects on behavior.”). 
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implicit versus explicit contracts on agent behavior.50 It found that 
principals who chose the explicit contract lost on average nine tokens 
per contract compared to a profit of twenty-six tokens per implicit 
contract.51 The difference was attributable to effort levels. The agents’ 
effort level in the implicit contract was 5.2 on average (out of ten), 
while the effort level in the explicit contract was 2.1 on average.52 
These results have been confirmed in other related studies.53  
Recently, similar results were obtained in a series of experiments 
in the field of business management.54 There, the study set out to 
determine whether adding more detail and additional clauses to 
contracts served to “crowd out rapport and undermine trust and 
cooperation.”55 It found a statistically significant correlation between 
contract completeness and signals of distrust.56 In other words, more 
detailed contracts make the relationship less personal and reduce the 
parties’ expectations of the relationship.57 The effect persists after  
50. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics 
of Reciprocity, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159, 176 (2000). 
51. Id. at 177.  
52. Id. Fehr et al. dismiss the possibility that the punishment vs. reward 
distinction explains the result based on the results of further 
experiments. Id. at 178 (citing Ernst Fehr et al., Endogenous Incomplete 
Contracts 1, 4 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies and Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, 
CESifo Working Paper No. 445) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
paper.taf?abstract_id=262015 (testing implicit contracts against fixed 
rate contracts)). 
53. See Scott, supra note 2, at 1663 (summarizing studies and explaining 
that “experimental evidence suggests that incompletely specified 
contracts that leave space for reciprocation can achieve higher levels of 
efficiency than more explicit, legally enforceable contracts”); see also Iris 
Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, 
Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 132 (2001) (finding 
that incentive contracts decrease cooperation); Bruno S. Frey & Reto 
Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 589–91 
(2001) (discussing how monetary benefits crowd out “intrinsic motiva-
tion”); Mark Lubell & John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Reciprocity, and 
the Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 160, 160–78 (2001) 
(finding that use of incentives can crowd out reciprocity). 
54. See Eileen Y. Chou et al., The Relational Costs of Complete Contracts 
(June 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1872569. 
55. Id. at 4; see also Bohnet et al., supra note 53, at 131–32 (discussing the 
effects of incentive contracts); Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on 
Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 659 (1999) (noting that 
“reward contingencies undermine people’s taking responsibility for 
motivating or regulating themselves”). 
56. Chou et al., supra note 54, at 12.  
57. Id. at 4.  
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negotiation, negatively impacting cooperative behavior during the life 
of the transaction.58 
These results are not solely experimental. Similar results have 
been confirmed in studies of real contracts. For instance, an empirical 
study of 102 business contractual disputes59 coded for provisions 
designed primarily to exert control and those intended to facilitate 
coordination.60 It tested for a correlation between control provisions 
and goodwill-based trust and competence-based trust61 and found that 
the greater the number of control provisions, the lower the level of 
goodwill-based trust.62 Relatedly, it found that the greater the number 
of control provisions, the lower the likelihood of continuing the 
relationship after disputes arose.63 Commercial entities rely on 
contracts both to facilitate coordination and control, but “including 
too many control provisions may, ironically, promote opportunistic 
behavior by inducing a ‘business’ rather than ‘ethical’ framing of the 
interaction.”64 This evidence is in stark contrast to the traditional 
economic assumption that detailed contracts and extensive control 
provisions better deter opportunistic behavior.65  
Why would it be the case that less-explicit contracts prompt 
better agent performance? Most experiments do little to answer the 
question.66 One theory is that less-specific contracts give agents more 
autonomy than more specific ones and boost intrinsic motivation.67  
58. See id. at 6–9.  
59. Deepak Malhotra & Fabrice Lumineau, Trust and Collaboration in the 
Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure, 54 Acad. 
Mgmt. J. 981 (2011).  
60. Id. at 982.  
61. The authors also studied the effect of coordination provisions on trust. 
Id. at 983–84.  
62. Id. at 990.  
63. Id. They also found that coordination provisions do not affect goodwill-
based trust; yet, the higher the level of coordination provisions, the 
higher the likelihood of continuing the relationship after a dispute. Id.  
64. Id. at 983. 
65. See also Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan, The Effects of 
Contracts on Interpersonal Trust, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 534, 534–59 
(discussing how overly controlling contracts with little room for 
discretion crowd out trust development). 
66. In general, behavioral economics focuses on predicting responses, not 
determining causation. 
67. Chou et al., supra note 46, at 4; see also Deci, et al., supra note 46, at 
139–40 (distinguishing between “self-regulated regulation” and “con-
trolled regulation”); Grolnick & Ryan, supra note 46, at 151–52 (noting 
differences in outcomes for autonomous students and students in more 
controlled settings); Ryan & Deci, supra note 46, at 68–76 (discussing 
self-determination theory).  
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Specificity in contracts, on the other hand, gives the agent the 
impression of lack of trust on the part of the principal.  
It should be noted, however, that there is much still to be studied 
on these behavioral responses, and not all research confirms these 
findings.68 A recent experiment conducted in the editing context 
sought to better understand the effect of specificity and good faith on 
compliance and performance.69 In part, the study confirmed findings 
in past work—that specificity can lead to “cognitive crowding out” by 
causing people to focus on the detailed instructions rather than the 
implications of the overall task.70 But it also found that specific 
instructions can enhance rather than harm performance, particularly 
in situations where guidance is needed.71 This same effect is not found 
under conditions of an ethical dilemma, however.72 Thus, one 
important lesson of this work is that context is very important. The 
next Section discusses the contexts in which incomplete contracting 
methods might be particularly efficient. 
2. Contexts Ripe for Flexible Contracting 
Certain contexts are more likely to lend themselves well to flexible 
contracting strategies than others. Consider again the two contracts 
hypothesized in the Introduction. A simple sales contract for widgets 
would probably not benefit from flexible contracting. Drafting a 
complete contract is a low cost endeavor, and, assuming a relatively 
fast delivery, there is likely little risk or uncertainty involved. The 
sole purpose of entering into a binding contract in a transaction like 
that is to ensure compliance and to obtain damages if there is  
68. Several studies find positive attributes of specificity, rather than 
crowding out, including Sergio G. Lazzarini et al., Order with Some 
Law: Complementarity Versus Substitution of Formal and Informal 
Arrangements, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 261, 290 (2004); and Mary 
Rigdon, Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting, 70 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 93, 103 (2009). See also Yuval Feldman, The 
Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance 
Motivations: Theoretical and Empirical Insights from the Behavioral 
Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 45 (2011) (discussing 
the “crowding out theory”); Eric A. Posner, Book Note, 101 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 509, 510 (2007) (reviewing ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B 
STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011)). 
69. Constantine Boussalis et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Effect of 
Specificity on Compliance and Performance 1, 3 (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).  
70. Id. at 26.  
71. Id. at 1–2.  
72. Id. at 30 (“We find much less evidence of a specificity effect when the 
context is shifted from specificity conferring guidance to specificity 
implying an ethical imperative.”). 
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compliance failure. Detailed contracting is typically sufficient. But the 
contract where a firm partners with another to co-develop new 
technology might be a good candidate for the flexible approach. 
The following examples describe contracting contexts where 
scholars have either observed incomplete contracting strategies being 
successfully employed or have suggested such strategies might be 
successfully implemented.73 The end of the Section generalizes these 
results and suggests a typology of contracts where this strategy might 
best be utilized. 
a. Contracting for Innovation  
Contracts for innovation generally come about where two parties 
agree to produce an innovative product—“one whose characteristics, 
costs, and manufacture, because of uncertainty, cannot be specified ex 
ante.”74 Contracts for innovation require collaboration. Either neither 
party individually has the capacity to both design and develop the 
product, or it is more cost effective to collaborate. Typically, the 
product development process is iterative, requiring cooperation over 
time and through multiple stages.75 
Gilson, Sabel, and Scott use as an illustration the Apple–SCI 
contract76 where Apple committed to purchase circuit boards and 
personal computers from SCI, the specifications of which were to be 
collaboratively determined. The contract does not set a price for the 
products, which would have been hard to do since the products were 
not yet specified, but rather describes a process and a formula by 
which a price would be set, allowing for bargaining between the 
parties. 
Apple and SCI’s contract utilizes both formal and informal 
mechanisms. The contract is formal in the sense that Apple agreed to 
purchase a defined percentage of its logic boards and computer 
systems from SCI during a three-year period (although it made no 
purchase commitments after the expiration of that period). And there 
is a formula by which to determine pricing. But it is also incomplete 
along many dimensions.   
73. While case studies have found some evidence of parties writing more 
incomplete contracts, there has not yet been any systematic study on 
this point. Importantly, there is no evidence that incomplete or flexible 
contracting is occurring at optimal levels. It is a key assumption of this 
Article that it is not and that it will not occur at optimal levels given 
current doctrinal constraints.  
74. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegra-
tion and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 451 (2009). 
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 463–67. The authors discuss two additional case studies: an 
agreement between Deere and Stanadyne and between Warner-Lambert 
and Ligand. Id. at 458–63, 467–71.  
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Apple does not give specifications for the products it will buy 
because they have to be developed. It does not even describe the 
process for coming to a Product Plan in any substantive detail.77 
Product Plans coming out of the agreement by necessity must 
respond to changes in technology and be prepared collaboratively.78 
The contract provides for appointment of a test engineer and for SCI 
to make its facilities available for inspection, so there are some 
elements of control.79 But much of the agreement is phrased in 
flexible, collaborative terms.80  
The authors point out that there are both traditional economic 
reasons and behavioral reasons that this arrangement works. Econo-
mically, the parties are bonded by parallel, relationship-specific 
investments that increase switching costs.81 Behaviorally, the authors 
argue that this type of contract works because the formal contract 
“complement[s] and support[s] relational governance structures” in the 
contract.82 “[F]ormal contracting operates importantly to facilitate the 
development of informal contracting structures that police the parties’ 
expectations of capability, cooperation, and trust.”83 
Apple and SCI could have attempted to draft an entirely formal, 
complete contingent contract, but to do so would have been very 
difficult and costly. Given the amount of collaboration and trust that 
is necessary to make such an arrangement a success, specified con-
tracting may also have added relational costs of the sort described in 
the prior Section.84  
b. Intellectual Property Licenses 
Intellectual Property (“IP”) licenses negotiated between sophis-
ticated parties are another context where scholars have suggested that 
the use of vague or incomplete terms might be an efficient drafting 
choice. An IP license allows an owner of IP rights to profit from an 
invention or creative work by charging a party a fee for the use of the 
idea. For example, an IP license might give a licensee permission to 
reproduce the licensor’s trademark on their products or to distribute 
the licensor’s computer software—for a fee.  
77. Id. at 465.  
78. Id.  
79. Id.  
80. Id. at 466.  
81. Id. at 488. 
82. Id. at 494. 
83. Id. at 472.  
84. Alternatively, the parties could have entered into a purely non-binding 
deal but chose not to do so. See infra Part II.A for further discussion of 
why agreements are not always self-enforcing.  
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The parties to IP license agreements are generally sophisticated 
entities who enter into non-rival agreements for mutual benefit.85 
There is often a strong collaborative component to these agreements.86 
For instance, in development agreements for drugs or medical devices, 
licensors are often required to support licensees in development and 
securing regulatory approvals.87 And in software license agreements, 
licensors often must provide technical support and training so that 
the licensees can effectively use the technology.88 As in contracts for 
innovation, IP license agreements also happen against a backdrop of 
complexity and uncertainty.89 Sometimes the licensed technology is 
still in development or the licensed drug is still undergoing clinical 
testing and waiting for regulatory approval.90 
IP license agreements, it follows, should provide fertile ground for 
the use of flexible contracting. Indeed, there is at least some 
indication that IP license agreements are incomplete (to a degree) in 
practice. For instance, IP licenses make use of open standards when it 
would have been possible to input specific, verifiable conditions. The 
following are some examples from a recent case study:  
“If a solution for a Severity 2 Error is unavailable immediately, 
Licensor shall make its best efforts to provide an acceptable 
workaround within a reasonable time”;  
“All Services performed under this Agreement shall be provided 
in a professional and workmanlike manner, using due 
care, consistent with prevailing industry standards”; 
and  
“Licensor shall continually improve its design and delivery of 
Services, and implement quality assurance processes and 
procedures necessary to perform the Services in accordance 
with industry standards” . . . . 
 
85. Shur-Ofry & Tur-Sinai, supra note 11 (manuscript at 4).  
86. Id. 
87. Id. (manuscript at 28).  
88. Id.  
89. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellec-
tual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 17–31 (2010) 
(discussing the results of an experiment attempting to model the 
uncertainty and asymmetry in ex ante valuing of intellectual property); 
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 31–52 (2011) (discussing the results of an 
experiment to model the “creativity effect” valuation anomaly in IP 
transactions). 
90. Shur-Ofry & Tur-Sinai, supra note 11 (manuscript at 26). 
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“LICENCEE shall launch the Product in the Territory at the 
earliest commercially reasonable date . . . .”’91 
It is also not unusual for parties to IP license agreements to fail to 
address contingencies.92 But like contracts for innovation, while IP 
licenses might be incomplete or ambiguous in some respects, they use 
explicit and formal mechanisms as well. This mix of incompleteness 
with formal mechanisms seems to work well when implemented.93  
c. Public-Private Contracting 
In a previous article, I argued that the outsourcing of complex 
government services is an area where detailed, control-based contracts 
are undesirable (yet still prevalent).94 When governments outsource 
services like running prisons and schools or administering state 
benefits, they tend to “write contracts that highly specify tasks, 
contain robust monitoring provisions, and financially reward task 
compliance.”95 But the approach is ill suited for the realities of the 
government-private entity relationship.96 Flexible contracting would 
likely be better. 
For one, it can be difficult to specify ex ante what it means to run 
a good prison or to be successful at welfare administration.97 And 
when governments outsource complex services, they often do so 
because the private sector is thought to be both more innovative and 
more efficient.98 If the government highly specifies tasks, it leaves 
little room in which the private entity can innovate or improve 
processes.99 At best, a government that highly specifies tasks can hope 
to obtain task compliance, but consummate performance that goes 
above and beyond expectations is unlikely.  
91. Id. (manuscript at 7) (emphasis in original).  
92. See id. (manuscript at 15, 22, 34) (providing examples of failures to 
address contingencies in IP license agreements). 
93. Note that the authors focus on incompleteness on the periphery of these 
transactions. It is unclear that there is sufficient evidence to merit the 
suggestion that the peripheral-ness of the incompleteness is the salient 
feature of these contracts. 
94. Wendy Netter Epstein, Public-Private Contracting and the Reciprocity 
Norm, AM. UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 7), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2427308. 
95. Id. (manuscript at 1). 
96. Id.  
97. Id. (manuscript at 28). It might be easy, however, to specify what it 
means to do a good job at road repair. Id. This argument is very 
context dependent.  
98. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
99. Id. (manuscript at 6).  
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Second, highly specified contracts tend not to work well because 
markets for these types of services are thin. Control-based contracts 
work where the agent is either worried about court enforcement or 
reputational sanctions.100 Where there are few switching options, both 
litigation and reputational harms are unlikely.101 Against the backdrop 
of a thin market, control-based contracts do not dissuade agents from 
acting opportunistically.102 
Because one of the primary goals of the contracting relationship is 
to motivate innovation, this context provides another example where 
less-detailed contracts might be preferable.103  
Limited studies focusing on local government outsourcing have 
found that less-rigid contracts do lead to better results.104 Nonetheless, 
detailed contracting seems to be the dominant approach in govern-
ment outsourcing.105  
C. Types of Contracts Where Implicit Rather Than Explicit 
Drafting May Engender More Efficient Results 
In synthesizing this work, a number of common characteristics 
emerge.106 A degree of incompleteness is particularly likely to be 
efficient where (1) the subject matter is particularly complex, (2) the 
future is uncertain, (3) market mechanisms do not adequately 
motivate high-quality agent performance, (4) cooperation between the 
parties is necessary, and (5) innovation is expected or desired. 
First, complexity is a common theme in the examples discussed 
above. As the Introduction alluded to, specification usually works well 
in straightforward transactions. For instance, if I contract to buy 
Smith’s car for $10,000, it makes sense that I should specify the 
 
100. Id. (manuscript at 17–18).  
101. Id. 
102. Id.  
103. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing experiments about motivating 
consummate performance rather than merely compliance). 
104. See, e.g., Sergio Fernandez, Accounting for Performance in Contracting 
for Services: Are Successful Contractual Relationships Controlled or 
Managed? 11 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://localgov.fsu.edu/readings_papers/Service%20Delivery/Fernandez
_Accounting_for_Performance_in_Contracting_Services.doc. 
105. There is a need for systematic empirical study in this area, but at least 
anecdotally, this is assumed to be the case. See Epstein, supra note 94 
(manuscript at 6).  
106. All of these contracts exist on a spectrum. This Article does not suggest 
that all characteristics must be present for more implicit contracts to 
trump more explicit ones. It simply argues that where more of these 
characteristics are present, it is more likely that less-specified contract-
ing is efficient. 
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precise car that is the subject of the transaction, state the price, the 
delivery date, etc. It is neither particularly difficult nor particularly 
costly to do so. But more complex transactions are a different story. 
Complexity is a trait shared by all three contexts discussed above—
contracting for innovation, IP licenses, and outsourcing government 
services. In complex transactions, ex ante detailing is particularly 
likely to be costly. Parties who try to detail complex transactions are 
more likely to make errors along the way. The counterargument, of 
course, is that complex transactions are sometimes of the type where 
the principal especially needs to provide detailed guidance to the 
agent, so determining where on the incompleteness spectrum a 
contract should be situated is particularly important.107  
Second, and relatedly, incomplete contracts can be desirable in 
high-uncertainty transactions. Parties are less likely to be able to 
predict at the drafting stage exactly how things will play out during 
contract performance. Trying to do so would result in high cost and 
potentially high rates of error. In addition to the benefit of minimizing 
transaction costs, uncertain transactions are more likely to benefit 
from flexibility.  
Third, less-detailed contracting is particularly likely to be efficient 
when parties contract in a shallow market. Where there is a failure of 
market mechanisms, traditional control-based mechanisms do not 
work well. Prompting positive social norms rather than relying on 
traditional control mechanisms is likely to yield better results.  
Fourth, one of the important takeaways of the behavioral 
scholarship is that incomplete contracting bolsters cooperation 
between the parties, particularly with the right framing. On the other 
hand, specificity can send the wrong signals to parties hoping for a 
collaborative working relationship: signals of mistrust and anticipation 
of litigation rather than trust and optimism. 
Fifth, contracts where innovation is highly valued might benefit 
from a more flexible approach to contracting. Put another way, 
traditional, highly detailed contracts are likely to be a good fit when 
compliance is the main contracting goal and can be easily detected. 
But highly detailed contracts crowd out intrinsic motivation and at 
best prompt adherence to the detailed requirements; they are poor 
motivators of agent innovation. Flexible contracting might be efficient 
when a contract lacks a central focus of compliance, like in the three 
examples depicted above. 
 
107. To be clear, this Article does not suggest that contracts should be 
entirely devoid of guidance to the agent. It simply suggests that on the 
completeness spectrum, many agreements would benefit from sliding 
closer to the more incomplete pole. 
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II. Deterrents to Drafting Less-Specified Contracts 
Given the merits of less-detailed contracting in certain situations, 
it is puzzling that the approach seems underutilized in the United 
States.108 This Part explores the doctrinal and sociolegal deterrents to 
writing less-detailed contracts—even when efficiency would dictate 
otherwise. 
A. Doctrinal Deterrents 
The majority of contracts are never litigated. Particularly in 
complex commercial deals, there is a norm against litigation.109 None-
theless, doctrine provides incentives for drafters, even when the 
default rules can be changed.110 Particularly sophisticated parties are 
influenced by the knowledge that contract law penalizes parties that 
fail to draft certain and specified contracts. This doctrinal choice 
stems from the traditional view of incompleteness as undesirable.111 
Contract doctrine can largely be categorized by the enduring 
struggle between the poles of formalism and contextualism.112 Until 
the mid-twentieth century, contract interpretation was formalist in 
the sense that the role of courts in contract disputes was to enforce 
the deals between parties by looking to the language the parties 
agreed to in the written document.113 Courts did little to investigate 
the fairness of deals or to review evidence of the agreement outside 
what appeared in the contract. Formalism is a rules-based approach. 
The normative justifications for formalism are freedom of contract 
and the virtues of certainty and predictability for the parties.  
 
108. Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as 
Much with Fewer Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889, 894 (2004) 
(describing the picture of U.S. complex business contracts as “very 
long,” with “a great deal of explanation, qualification, and limitation in 
the language,” and “a great deal of ‘legalese’”). But see Gilson et al., 
supra note 7, at 451 (discussing characteristics of three American 
examples of less-detailed business contracts); Shur-Ofry & Tur-Sinai, 
supra note 11 (manuscript at 15) (explaining the importance of less-
detailed contracts in IP transactions). 
109. Hill, supra note 37, at 208. 
110. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).  
111. See, e.g., Duhl, supra note 4, at 77 (“Part of lawyers’ professional 
obligation is to draft clear contractual language for their clients.”); 
Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 847, 871–75 (2000) (arguing for formalist interpretation 
of contracts). 
112. Contextualism is sometimes also referred to as a form of realism. 
113. Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New 
Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 499 (2010). 
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With the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, contract doctrine became more 
contextualist. Contextualism is a standards-based approach that gives 
courts discretion to look outside the four corners of a contract to 
assess the reasonableness and fairness of the deal, keeping in mind the 
relative bargaining power of the parties.114 Contextualism’s normative 
goal is to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties. The move 
to contextualist contract doctrine was not without its critics, 
particularly in those concerned for the loss of certainty and predict-
ability.  
Most recently, in reaction to these concerns, the pendulum has 
started to swing back again toward formalist contract doctrine. The 
so-called “neoformalist” movement115—at least amongst scholars,116 
but arguably amongst the courts as well117—centers mostly on 
commercial transactions between sophisticated parties.118 Neoform-
alists argue that parties prefer courts to interpret contracts literally 
and not to look at a broader evidence base.119 They also argue that 
parties are better situated than the court to make decisions about the 
contract.  
Both during the contextualist period and the return of formalism, 
sophisticated parties engaging in commercial transactions have been 
held to a different set of rules than others.120 Courts presume that  
114. In particular, the Uniform Commercial Code allows for interpreting 
reference to prior course of dealing, trade usage, and course of perfor-
mance between the parties to interpret or supplement the contract. 
U.C.C. § 1-303 (2012); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 
201 (4th ed. 2004). 
115. John E. Murray Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 870 (2002). 
116. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 619 (2003) (focusing on 
business entities).  
117. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
118. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 116, at 545 (limiting analysis only to 
business entities that “can be expected to understand how to make 
business contracts”). 
119. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 
119 Yale L.J. 926, 932 (2010) (“[B]oth the available evidence and 
prevailing judicial practice support the claim that sophisticated parties 
prefer textualist interpretation.”). 
120. Miller, supra note 113, at 501 (“Increasingly, sophisticated parties are 
held to a different set of rules . . . For them, formalism prevails.”); 
Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 
415, 421 (N.Y. 1995) (“If [sophisticated parties] are dissatisfied with the 
consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to say so [was] at the 
bargaining table.’” (quoting Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, 502 
N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 1986))). 
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sophisticated parties negotiate their deals thoroughly; that what the 
contract says is what the contract means; and that had the parties 
wanted different terms, they would have included those terms in the 
agreement. Particularly for sophisticated parties, formalism has been 
enduring in contract law. And the message to sophisticated parties in 
a formalist regime is “draft contracts clearly.”121  
With this as background, I explore in the next subparts the 
doctrinal deterrents to drafting incomplete contracts and the ways in 
which contract doctrine dissuades parties from choosing to draft 
purposely incomplete contracts. 
1. Indefiniteness Doctrine 
The clearest impediment to less-specified contracts is the 
indefiniteness doctrine. The indefiniteness doctrine holds a contract 
unenforceable if its terms are too indefinite. According to the 
formulation in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,122 the terms of 
a contract must be “reasonably certain” in the sense that they must 
“provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for 
giving an appropriate remedy.”123 The premise is that a “contract” 
that leaves fundamental parts of the deal undefined is not a contract 
at all. The parties must not have intended for it to be binding.124 
With the indefiniteness doctrine, the law seeks to deter parties from 
drafting incomplete contracts. 
In the contextual approach to contract law, only truly material 
terms must be definite for the court to find that a contract exists.125 
Courts will fill gaps if there are holes in nonmaterial (or peripheral) 
aspects of the deal. If a court determines that a document (or an oral 
agreement) is too uncertain to be considered an enforceable contract, 
however, it will leave the parties as it found them.  
For many years, scholars assumed that the indefiniteness doctrine 
was essentially dead because of the modern promise to liberally fill  
121. Duhl, supra note 4, at 76. 
122. Contract doctrine varies by state but the Restatement Second is a good 
enough proxy for purposes of this Article. See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts (1981) [hereinafter Restatement]. 
123. Id. at § 33; see also U.C.C. §§ 2-204(3), 2-305 (2012) (allowing for inde-
finite and open terms); Daniel P. O’Gorman, The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts’ Reasonably Certain Terms Requirement: A Model of 
Neoclassical Contract Law and a Model of Confusion and Inconsistency, 
36 U. HAW. L. REV. 169, 172 (2014) (discussing the requirement for 
“reasonably certain” terms in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).  
124. The assumption that a contract lacking in specificity is not meant to be 
binding is tenuous at best. See supra Part I.  
125. For instance, the Uniform Commercial Code requires quantity be speci-
fied for a contract to exist, but allows courts to assign a reasonable price 
if one is not specified by the parties. See U.C.C. § 2-305 (2012). 
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gaps.126 But a recent study demonstrated that the doctrine lives on, 
and there is not only “a surprisingly high volume of litigation” on 
indefiniteness, but “[i]n literally dozens of cases, American courts 
dismiss claims for breach of contract on the grounds of indefiniteness, 
often without granting any relief to the disappointed promisee.”127 
These findings are consistent with the observation that while the 
U.C.C. and Restatement (Second) are ostensibly contextualist, many 
courts still favor a formalist approach, particularly for sophisticated 
parties. 
From the perspective of parties at the drafting stage, the 
indefiniteness doctrine imparts risk for both sides if litigation 
ultimately results and a court refuses to enforce an indefinite contract. 
It will almost always be unclear at the contract drafting stage which 
party would be penalized if a court ultimately finds the contract to be 
unenforceable. Accordingly, both parties have an incentive to ensure 
that a court will find the agreement to be binding, and to do that, the 
agreement must be sufficiently definite. 
Parties could, on the other hand, enter into agreements that rely 
exclusively on nonlegal sanctions. If nonlegal sanctions are always 
effective and court enforcement unnecessary, the indefiniteness 
doctrine is less problematic. Reputation, industry norms, and future 
business prospects are sometimes sufficient to constrain behavior,128 
but not always. For instance, nonlegal norms do not function 
particularly well in industries “that involve infrequent and uncertain 
transactions.”129 More generally, a contract involves a promise to do 
something in the future when the future is unknown.130 When a party 
must make a relationship-specific investment, it is risky to take a 
chance on an agreement without the coercive power of the state to 
back it up. Absent the ability to litigate and seek damages, a party is 
vulnerable to exploitation if the other party fails to perform its end of 
the bargain. The prospect of formal enforcement is particularly 
necessary to encourage efficient contracting with new and untested 
 
126. George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1666 (2006) (“Conventional wisdom says that 
the indefiniteness doctrine is dead—or at least in its waning hours.”). 
127. Scott, supra note 2, at 1643–44; see also Geis, supra note 126, at 1684–
85 (citing data to show that “if anything, judicial encounters with the 
indefiniteness doctrine may be increasing”).  
128. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton 
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1737–38 (2001) (discussing expulsion from trade 
associations as one constraint on behavior). 
129. See Badawi, supra note 26, at 1. 
130. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 23, at 282 (“The intertemporal aspect of 
transactions makes contract law’s strict liability highly salient.”). 
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business partners and in industries where market mechanisms do not 
function well.131  
2. Rules of Interpretation 
Canons of contract interpretation also disincentivize flexible 
contracting. How courts interpret contracts matters to parties. A high 
percentage of contract-related litigation concerns questions of 
interpretation.132  
Contract interpretation generally focuses on discerning the intent 
of the parties at contract formation. There is no single hard-and-fast 
rule of contract interpretation.133 In general, though, formalist courts 
will look to the contract language (the four corners of the document) 
as the best evidence of party intent. Contextualist courts, on the 
other hand, take a broader approach and will consider extrinsic 
evidence.  
Contract interpretation rules raise two particular problems from 
the perspective of the parties at the drafting stage wishing to draft 
less-specified contracts: (1) some canons of interpretation are 
intentionally punitive to incompleteness or ambiguity, purposely 
disincentivizing flexible contracting; and (2) court focus on ascertain-
ing the intent of the parties at execution rewards those that have 
worked out all of the details at execution, not those intending to 
evolve their agreement over time.  
First, the doctrine most obviously punitive to ambiguity is the 
doctrine of contra proferentem, or construe against the drafter.134 It 
suggests that contract provisions that are ambiguous on their face 
should be construed to benefit the non-drafting party and to punish 
the drafting party. The theory is that the drafting party, usually the 
party with greater bargaining power, is in a better position to use 
clear language. The doctrine has its genesis in the insurance context  
131. See Simon Johnson et al., Courts and Relational Contracts, 18 J.L. 
ECON. & ORGAN. 221, 221 (2002); see also Badawi, supra note 26, at 40 
(discussing “increased reliance on a formal dispute resolution system as 
a consequence of larger group size and decreased heterogeneity”); Scott, 
supra note 23, at 286 (“[I]nformal enforcement mechanisms . . . are less 
effective in controlling complex, interactive relationships.”) (citation 
omitted); Nathan Nunn, Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, 
and the Pattern of Trade, 122 Q. J. ECON. 569, 570 (2007) (noting that 
“countries with better contract enforcement” succeed in “industries for 
which relationship-specific investments are most important”). 
132. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 116, at 547 (discussing how courts 
“cannot enforce contracts . . . without a theory of interpretation”).  
133. For a good description of contract doctrine and the canons of contract 
interpretation, see ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT 
LAW (Rev. ed., 1993). 
134. See Restatement, supra note 122, at § 206. 
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where courts wanted to prevent insurers from purposely using vague 
language in their policies to later argue for an interpretation favorable 
to the insurer.135 Contra proferentem is an obvious manifestation of 
the law’s goal to incentivize complete contracts. While contra 
proferentem does still arise in litigation with some frequency, it is 
infrequently applied in contracts between two sophisticated parties, 
where both parties likely had or could have had a hand in drafting.136  
Formalist contract interpretation is also punitive to incomplete 
drafting. And in matters of interpretation concerning two sophisti-
cated business entities, courts are likely to be more formalist in 
approach than contextualist.137 Formalist interpretation places great 
weight on the content of the written agreement, encouraging parties 
to be as complete as possible in drafting the agreement.138 It is marked 
by a strong parol evidence rule, which states that a final integrated 
agreement cannot be contradicted by extrinsic evidence in litigation. 
And “the absence of a written term is taken to imply that the parties 
reached no agreement over some contingency, and the contract is 
enforced accordingly.”139 Formalist contract interpretation is highly 
problematic for parties who might otherwise consider using a more 
incomplete contract. 
Also, some scholars have suggested that contract doctrine should 
go even further to penalize parties for writing incomplete contracts. 
Ayres and Gertner, for instance, have suggested that courts should 
adopt default rules to fill gaps in contracts that the parties would not 
want. This will create incentives for parties to reveal information 
during contract negotiation and write complete contracts.140 
 
135. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of 
Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2006).  
136. The existence of the doctrine furthers the notion that ambiguity and 
incompleteness are disfavored even though its practical effect is limited. 
137. See Miller, supra note 113, at 495–96. 
138. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 116, at 549; see also Chunlin 
Leonhard, Beyond the Four Corners of a Written Contract: A Global 
Challenge to U.S. Contract Law, 21 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) 
(“U.S. courts will generally refuse to look beyond the four corners of the 
written contract.”); Badawi, supra note 26, at 33–34 (“In more formal 
regimes, where judges and arbitrators are likely to put more effort into 
discerning the meaning of contract terms before turning to extrinsic 
evidence, parties will have an incentive to devote more resources to 
contract drafting because it is more likely that the terms of the contract 
will have an effect on the outcome of any litigation that arises.”). 
139. Hadfield, supra note 34, at 161. 
140. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 97; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1593 
(1999). 
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The law’s focus on ascertaining party intent at contract 
execution, both in formalist and contextualist regimes, also 
disincentivizes flexible contracting.141 As discussed in Part I, flexible 
contracting might be most appropriate when ex ante detailing is hard 
to do and the future is particularly uncertain. The concept is that the 
parties will collaborate and evolve their agreement over time. Because 
contract interpretation focuses on contract execution rather than 
considering the evolution of the parties’ agreement, there is a high 
probability of error in adjudication. Putting aside whether courts are 
good at ascertaining intent in the first place, there is an even higher 
probability of error when courts are not asking the right question.  
For a variety of reasons, then, parties concerned about ex post 
interpretation issues have incentives ex ante to be detailed and 
specific in their contracting. This is particularly true under a formalist 
regime that places much significance on the four corners of the 
contract, but it is true even with contextualist courts seeking to 
ascertain the intent of the parties at contract execution.142 
B. Sociolegal Deterrents 
Scholars have long recognized that the law “‘is not an 
autonomous system, but an integral part of the social life of a 
community.’”143 In addition to doctrine, professional and commercial 
norms provide powerful incentives that affect party behavior.144 There 
are a number of sociolegal deterrents that affect drafting decisions.  
 
141. Choi et al., supra note 110, at 2 (“Scholars frequently assume that 
parties draft bespoke contracts that serve the needs of specific 
transactions.”). 
142. For the most part, contract rules are default rules that the parties could 
contract around. They nonetheless create incentives for parties. See 
infra Part III. 
143. Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 
26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 381 (1997) (quoting E. Donald Elliott, The 
Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 38, 40 
(1985), which traces the notion back to scholar Friedrich Karl von 
Savigny). 
144. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1253, 1262 (1999) (describing the process by which social norms 
associated with occupational roles are internalized as extremely 
important to the legal and economic literature, although under-
analyzed); see also Badawi, supra note 26, at 38 (“One of the great 
insights of the literature on law and social norms is that belief systems 
and community norms can provide powerful behavioral incentives.”) 
(footnote omitted); cf. Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: 
The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea, 25 LAW. & SOC’Y REV. 759, 
777 (1991) (discussing community norms that enforce legal transact-
ions); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution 
Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 668 (1986) 
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It helps to better understand the context in which many of the 
target contracts—those for which flexible contracting might be more 
efficient—arise. The ideal of two parties negotiating the terms of a 
deal and then sitting down to put pen to paper is not commonplace in 
practice. Rather, as George Triantis recently described: 
Rarely is a contract in any given transaction made from whole 
cloth and, despite the sentiments of some lawyers, contracts are 
not creative works of literature. Rather than writing from 
scratch, lawyers typically reuse contract provisions from 
previous transactions. Individually and within their firms, they 
store and retrieve documents from past deals and follow 
procedures for standardizing best practices for different types of 
transactions.145 
The first reality is that lawyers are often copying large parts of 
contracts from one transaction to the next. Given that most large 
deals have long, detailed contracts with lots of boilerplate provisions, 
there is a certain momentum, or “stickiness,”146 to the detailed 
contracting method.147  
The template, in other words, is lengthy and detailed at the start. 
But then comes the customization. Contracts (and the lawyers who 
draft them) are often judged by their thoroughness.148 Claire Hill 
suggests that, particularly when sophisticated entities negotiate large 
transactions, the norm in the U.S. is to custom tailor to the hilt. 
Parties start with the typical detailed framework and boilerplate 
clauses and then do everything they can to anticipate what might go 
wrong or how the other party might try to act opportunistically.149 
 
(noting that neighbors will cooperate with one another even when 
“inconsistent with formal legal rules”). 
145. George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Techno-
logy, and Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
177, 186 (2013). 
146. See supra note 140 and accompanying text; Triantis, supra note 145, at 
194 (“As legal scholars have noted, standard contract terms are often 
sticky or locked-in practices.”); see also Kenneth A. Adams, Dysfunction 
in Contract Drafting: The Causes and a Cure, 15 TRANSACTIONS: 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 317, 318 (2013) (discussing the reasons that lawyers 
resist revising standard language). 
147. See also Choi et al., supra note 110 at 3 (noting that “the majority 
of . . . contracts are modifications of existing templates, including older 
contracts or forms”). 
148. Thoroughness is assumed to be a positive attribute. But see supra Part 
I. 
149. This view of the role of a lawyer in drafting comes in part from the 
norms of the profession generally, which view lawyers as more aggressive 
and competitive than other professionals. 
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Abiding by this norm of custom tailoring, Hill says, “will never 
engender criticism, but if there should be a dispute over the contract 
language later on, not having abided by the norm may very well be 
punished . . . .”150 The question will be asked, “[C]ould more care have 
clarified the language sufficiently to avoid the dispute (or to easily 
prevail at litigation)?”151  
Young lawyers receive the message very clearly. They must not 
only pay attention to clarity in drafting contracts, but if it later turns 
out that they did not anticipate a contingency and it harms the 
client, their professional advancement will suffer.152 This norm likely 
stems from the traditional assumption that imprecise contracts cause 
litigation.  
The message that clear and detailed contracting is the ideal starts 
as early as law school. In law school drafting classes, law students are 
taught that “good” contracts are highly detailed, consistent, 
unambiguous, and anticipate future states of the world.153 While no 
contract can be entirely complete, and on this point there is much 
agreement, completeness is nonetheless a goal toward which to strive. 
There is cost associated with writing highly specified contracts,154 but 
lawyers are taught that with that cost should come many benefits, 
such as more certainty for the parties and a lower likelihood that the 
relationship will break down. Indeed, it would be difficult to find too 
many lawyers who would advise their clients that a contract should 
be less detailed.155 One scholar has even suggested that lawyers are 
ethically obligated to “draft clear contractual language for their 
clients.”156  
 
150. Hill & King, supra note 108, at 902. 
151. Id.; see also id. at 899 (“The effect on contract documentation is 
cumulative: Parties in the U.S. start with ‘forms’ that are already quite 
cluttered with language from previous deals in which the forms were 
used, and clutter them further.”). 
152. Hill, supra note 37, at 205. 
153. See generally STARK, supra note 3 (devoting considerable attention to 
clarity and avoiding ambiguity). 
154. Admittedly, that cost may be reduced by the reuse of detailed form 
contracts and boilerplate. 
155. In prior work, I advocated for less-detailed contracting in the govern-
ment outsourcing context. Epstein, supra note 94. I was met with 
skepticism along these lines: What lawyer would ever advise her client 
to draft a less-detailed contract? Those questions prompted this Article. 
It seems intuitively true that lawyers would not advocate for less detail, 
but perhaps they should.  
156. Duhl, supra note 4, at 77. 
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Client expectations also help to sustain these norms. Clients 
expect detailed and thorough contracts.157 Having little other means 
for judging a contract at execution, clients equate length and 
thoroughness with good lawyering. And because transactional lawyers 
also play the role of adviser, there is a premium on certainty. 
Finally, particularly at the large law firms that handle most of the 
contract drafting for large, sophisticated entities, compensation is 
based on hourly billable rates.158 Lawyers get paid for the amount of 
time they spend negotiating and drafting contracts. They therefore 
have little incentive to suggest that clients use more standard-like, 
less-detailed contracts.  
III. Contract Doctrine Should, but Fails to, Support 
Intentionally Incomplete Drafting  
Contract doctrine should better reflect the evolution of our 
understanding of incomplete contracts. Current doctrine assumes that 
incomplete contracts result from error and universally deters parties 
from drafting such contracts. We now know that in certain contexts, 
incomplete contracts are desirable and efficient. A one-size-fits-all 
doctrinal approach to contract drafting no longer makes sense. 
There is a vast literature on incomplete contracts that precedes 
this Article. This scholarship can loosely be categorized into two (not 
mutually exclusive) camps. The first camp furthers the traditional 
argument that incomplete contracts are undesirable and parties 
should be deterred from drafting them. Contract law should therefore 
be formalist.159 The second camp argues that incomplete contracts can 
be desirable. Scholars observe that parties sometimes enter into 
incomplete contracts despite the deterrent effect of doctrine and posit 
 
157. Id. at 79. (decrying conscious ambiguity and arguing that lawyers have 
professional and ethical obligations to draft contracts clearly but not 
addressing the merits of flexible contracting as discussed in this Article). 
158. In a mid-size or small firm, it is common to negotiate a flat fee for a 
project, particularly for smaller clients. But the large firms still handle a 
high percentage of drafting the type of deals on which this Article 
focuses. 
159. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 111, at 852 (“All contracts are relational, 
complex and subjective. But contract law, whether we like it or not, is 
none of those things. Contract law is formal, simple, and (returning to 
Macneil’s terminology) classical.”); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative 
Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 
793 (1999) (“The greater the courts’ allegiance to the writing, the more 
careful will the parties be in drafting the written document.”); Frederick 
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (reviewing scholarship on 
formalism and proposing a doctrinal return to it); Duhl, supra note 4, at 
77 (arguing that lawyers are ethically obligated to draft clear and 
definite contracts). 
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that the reason is that these contracts are self-enforcing.160 In other 
words, doctrine is irrelevant because nonlegal norms will govern the 
relationships. These two camps are like ships passing in the night. 
This is the first Article to bridge the gap. Like the first camp, it 
notes that doctrine has incentive effects on drafting. But like the 
second camp, it suggests that incomplete contracts are not always 
undesirable and are sometimes the more efficient choice. Doctrine can 
therefore over-deter the use of incomplete contracts. 
A. Doctrine Has Incentive Effects on Drafting 
One of the great advances of the law and economics movement 
was to shift scholarly attention from ex post judicial decision making 
to the ex ante perspective.161 Why do parties enter into contracts and 
what affects their choices to do so? Scholars now generally agree that 
litigation decisions and legal doctrine in general create incentives for 
parties at the drafting stage.162 Transactional lawyers draft contracts 
to avoid litigation or to give their clients the best hopes of winning in 
litigation should it result. Contract doctrine presently deters parties 
 
160. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 128, at 1745–54 (discussing the 
importance of reputation and non-legal sanctions in the cotton 
industry); Scott, supra note 2, at 1644 (“Another answer is that these 
agreements may be self-enforcing.”); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and 
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2039–42 
(1987) (describing self-enforcing agreements); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177, 183 (1985) (“[C]ontract 
execution goes efficiently to completion because [some] pro-
mises . . . are . . . self-enforcing.”); Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-
Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1401 (2009) (discuss-
ing reasons why parties are hesitant to use litigation to enforce 
contracts). 
161. See Scott, supra note 111, at 849 (noting that ex ante efficiency is 
“designed to protect (and even improve) the utility of the set 
of contractual signals for future parties”). 
162. See, e.g., Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at 851 (arguing that the 
outcome of MAC clause litigation should be “of great interest to 
contract scholars” because it will lead to “significant revision or 
redrafting of these provisions in the next generation of contracts”); Choi 
et al., supra note 110, at 7 (“When contracting parties abandon a 
standard and adopt a new form contract, they take the risk that courts 
will interpret their terms in an unpredictable way.”); Avery Wiener 
Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract 
Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 497 (2004) (stating that 
interpretation doctrine “significantly shape[s] the ways in which the 
contract provides incentives and allocates risk”); Charles J. Goetz & 
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. 
L. REV. 261, 264, 268–71, 311 (1985) (noting that the judicial approach 
to contract interpretation has “far-reaching feedback effects on the 
operation of the ex ante contractual signalling [sic] system”). 
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from using flexible forms of contracting.163 Parties can signal to a 
court via contract language a preference for more contextual 
interpretation in litigation. However, because of the norms discussed 
in Part II.B and the stickiness of default rules, such decisions are 
rare.164 Doctrinal reform has the potential to change the incentives, to 
spur rather than deter the efficient use of incomplete forms of 
contracting.165 
Critics suggest that transactional lawyers do not pay attention to 
doctrine and that it has little effect on contract drafting choices. 
Litigators and transactional lawyers do not mix much in practice, 
form contracts do not change much over time, and parties assume 
contracts will never be litigated. It may be true that transactional 
lawyers and litigators live in very separate worlds.166 However, “it 
surely cannot be the case that the legal rules have no effect on the 
conduct of commercial activity generally.”167 We would not see so 
much customization of contracts if transactional lawyers truly were 
not thinking about the prospects of later litigation.168 And there is 
evidence that contract language (even the so-called “boilerplate”) is 
sensitive to shocks such as doctrinal changes or changes in the 
marketplace.169 So transactional lawyers do not just have their heads 
in the sand. 
As for the argument that agreements are self-enforcing—or that 
parties look to enforcement mechanisms outside the court system—
 
163. See infra Part II.A. 
164. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract 
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 611 (1998) (“[W]hen law-
makers anoint a contract term the default, the substantive preferences 
of parties shift—that term becomes more desirable . . . .”). 
165. The need to reform contract doctrine to better reflect contract realities 
rather than the traditional rational actor assumptions is a central task 
of contemporary sociolegal scholarship. 
166. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF 
MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT 
DESIGN 164 (2013) (noting anecdotally that “litigators and transactional 
lawyers rarely combine their specialized skills at the level of the 
individual transaction”). 
167. CATHERINE MITCHELL, CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT PRACTICE: 
BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN LEGAL REASONING AND COMMERCIAL 
EXPECTATION 32 (2013). 
168. See M. H. Sam Jacobson, A Checklist for Drafting Good Contracts, 5 
J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 79, 80 (2008) (“Like any legal 
writing, good drafting requires knowing the law and the substance 
first . . . .”). 
169. Choi et al., supra note 110, at 3; see also Triantis, supra note 145, at 
192 (identifying triggers for innovation in contract language to be “(1) 
learning, (2) regulatory changes and (3) changes in market conditions”). 
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this is undoubtedly true in some circumstances and in particular 
industries. Reputation and the potential for repeat dealings can 
constrain party behavior. Perhaps that is why we do see some use of 
these more flexible contracting methods despite inhospitable doctrine. 
But these nonlegal mechanisms only work in certain conditions.170 
Plenty of contracts are still litigated that appear not to have been 
self-enforcing.171 Further, studies have indicated that the prospect of 
future legal enforcement can be important to spur contracting, 
particularly when dealing with new partners.172 Finally, the 
development of braiding, where parties weave together formal and 
informal contract mechanisms, further supports the assumption that 
parties do not simply ignore the prospect of future litigation, or at 
least that this question is context- and industry-specific.173  
B. Doctrine Should Be Tolerant of Incompleteness 
Because the current default rule universally disincentivizes 
incomplete contracts, it should be changed for the universe of 
contracts where flexible contracting is actually efficient. Whether one 
agrees with this statement depends in part on what one thinks the 
normative goal of contract doctrine should be. There are innumerable 
arguments on this point, ranging from efficiency to autonomy and 
fairness to consent, and everything in between. Focusing only on 
commercial contracting between two parties where these flexible 
contracting mechanisms are most likely to add value, however, there 
is more consensus than in other areas of contract law. The normative 
goal of doctrine should be to support commercial activity and 
generate efficient outcomes.174 Good contract law meets the needs and 
expectations of the commercial parties.175 
 
170. See generally Badawi, supra note 26, at 1 (noting that contracts are not 
as self-enforcing in industries where transactions are infrequent and 
uncertain, such as “construction, tailored software, and the market for 
mergers and acquisitions”); see also Scott, supra note 2, at 1644 
(“Reputations work best in markets for homogeneous goods or in ethnic-
ally homogeneous communities . . . .”). 
171. Scott, supra note 2, at 1644 (“[M]ost of the recently litigated cases do 
not appear to be self-enforcing in the traditional sense.”). 
172. E.g., Johnson et al., supra note 131, at 260–61 (discussing a study of 
contracts in post-communist countries and finding that formal court 
enforcement encourages parties to try out new suppliers and generally 
supports relational contracting). 
173. See generally Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of 
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) (providing a discussion of braiding). 
174. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 116, at 556 (“[O]ur principal 
normative claim [is] that contract law should facilitate the ability of 
firms to maximize welfare when making commercial contracts.”); 
Mitchell, supra note 167, at 3 (“For [the neoformalist] branch of 
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If efficiency and furthering commerce is the goal, the problem is 
evident. Parties would be better off by entering into flexible contracts 
in the contexts described in Part II. It would prompt more commer-
cial activity, more collaboration, more innovation, and in general 
would grow the size of the pie.176 But “the specter of litigation has 
made people less willing to use informal agreements to order their 
affairs.”177 Contract law is still based on the classic ideal of 
contracting and the assumption of rational, self-interested actors. It 
imposes on the parties a structure that hinders efficient transacting. 
The assumptions on which the law was based—that incomplete 
contracts always result from error and are undesirable—do not match 
today’s reality. Doctrine is not adhering to its normative goal.  
Perhaps doctrinal change is not necessary and parties will start 
experimenting with these contracting forms without the need to 
change the law.178 It is true that some experimentation is happening, 
at least in certain industries. However, it will be hard to change the 
current default of complete, contingent contracting, in part because of 
the sociolegal deterrents discussed in Part II.B. Some sort of a 
shock—like a change to legal doctrine—will be necessary to encourage 
experimentation with more flexible contracts.179   
contract scholarship, the design of contracts and contract law should 
reflect instrumental goals such as wealth maximisation.”). 
175. This is admittedly an oversimplification. Catherine Mitchell’s excellent 
book explores in some detail the relationship between contract law and 
commercial expectations. Mitchell, supra note 167. She points out 
that it cannot be the case that we should just align contract law with 
whatever the parties would want. Id. at 4 (“Whatever the precise role of 
contract law in commercial dealing, it must involve more than simply 
arbitrarily bestowing legal validity on whatever actions or decisions the 
community of commercial contractors take in the pursuit of their 
business interests.”). 
176. Although flexible contracting is in use in certain limited contexts, there 
is evidence that it should be used more widely. For instance, scholars 
suggest use of flexible contracting in government outsourcing and 
construction contracts, to name a couple. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 
94 (manuscript at 7) (“[W]here the traditional method doesn’t work, 
governments should try the opposite and write less-detailed contracts.”); 
M. Motiar Rahman et al., Building a Relational Contracting Culture 
and Integrated Teams, 34 CAN. J. CIV. ENG. 75, 86 (2007) (finding that 
“trust and trust-based operational and contractual arrangements can 
effectively provide the right incentives for the . . . construction indu-
stry”). 
177. Gergen, supra note 160, at 1401. 
178. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role 
of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 172 (2013) (arguing that contractual innovation 
starts with the parties and reaches the courts later in the process). 
179. Choi et al., supra note 110, at 3.  
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The final Part suggests how doctrine should be reformed to better 
reflect and support these new models of contracting.  
IV. Contract Doctrine Should Be Both 
Contextual and Dynamic 
Having argued that the law should incentivize flexible 
contracting, this Part takes up the question of how that could be 
accomplished. Generally speaking, formalism begets complete, 
contingent contracts. Contextualism supports flexible contracting. 
This argument is not novel. But this Article goes a step further, 
suggesting that even contextualism as currently applied has the wrong 
focus to support flexible contracting. Contextualism is static, focusing 
on discerning the intent of the parties at contract execution.180 But 
contracts are not static, particularly not the type that are the focus of 
this Article. They are dynamic and, at least for certain categories of 
contracts, contract interpretation should be, too. 
A. Formalist Interpretation 
There are many contexts where it makes sense to draft complete, 
contingent contracts: where transactions costs for doing so would be 
low, there is little uncertainty in the transaction, and market forces 
are well functioning.181 In these contracts, the main goal tends to be 
compliance, not collaboration or innovation. Parties drafting these 
sorts of complete contracts understandably prefer formalist interpret-
ation.182 They have detailed the terms of their agreement and would 
prefer that a court just enforce it as drafted, relying on the four 
corners of the written document. Formalism in these circumstances 
has the benefit of certainty for the parties, makes litigation less costly, 
and supports the norm of freedom of contract. Parties preferring 
detailed drafting and formalist interpretation should be able to obtain 
it. This Article does not argue otherwise. Indeed, these parties can 
even specify this preference for formal interpretation explicitly in their 
complete contract. What this Article does argue, however, is that the 
default rule should not be formalist interpretation. 
Despite the overall contextualist approach of the U.C.C. and the 
Restatement Second, “a strong majority of U.S. courts continue to fol-
low the traditional, ‘formalist’ approach to contract interpretation 
 
180. But see supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the law’s 
provision for course of performance evidence). 
181. See, e.g., Badawi, supra note 26, at 20 (suggesting that where industry 
transactions are “high frequency, low uncertainty, and take place in the 
context of high insularity,” parties can draft more complete contracts at 
lower cost and prefer formalist interpretation). 
182. Id.  
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. . . .”183 This is true for sophisticated parties in particular.184 Courts 
frequently note that there is no need to “rewrite” an agreement 
entered into between sophisticated parties.185 Particularly when it 
comes to questions of contract interpretation, then, courts are often 
more formalist when dealing with sophisticated parties.186 
The neoformalist movement suggests an even further move to the 
formalism pole. For instance, neoformalists have suggested a universal 
strengthening of the indefiniteness doctrine.187 They argue that 
withholding enforceability of incomplete contracts will force parties to 
fully negotiate and specify contract terms that can later be easily 
interpreted by a court.188 Parties who leave gaps in their contracts 
should not be able to shift the cost of ex ante drafting onto the 
judiciary ex post.189 The canon of contra proferentem has a similar 
justification. Neoformalists also favor a strong parol evidence rule for 
much the same reason. Interpretive focus should be on the document, 
not on extrinsic evidence. 
But because the default rule should not favor ex ante 
specification,190 this Article takes issue with the formalist approach. 
To the contrary, the indefiniteness doctrine should be flexible, not 
strict; contra proferentem should be dispensed with; and courts 
 
183. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 119, at 926. 
184. Miller, supra note 113, at 495–96. 
185. Id. at 496. 
186. Id.; see also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 119, at 932 (“[B]oth the 
available evidence and prevailing judicial practices support the claim 
that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation.”). 
187. See Scott, supra note 111, at 859–60 (proposing that courts decline to 
interpret indefinite terms at all); George S. Geis, Broadcast Contracting, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1193–94 (2012) (calling the indefiniteness 
doctrine “an important and legitimate escape valve for the 
interpretative task” because parties leaving gaps in contracts should not 
be able to externalize those costs). 
188. See Scott, supra note 2, at 1647, 1687 (arguing that “the theory of 
reciprocal fairness supports adherence to the common law indefiniteness 
doctrine,” which is that a contract is unenforceable unless it is “certain 
and definite such that [the parties’] intention may be ascertained with a 
reasonable degree of certainty”). 
189. Geis, supra note 187, at 1194. 
190. Parties could still choose ex ante specification. See Katz, supra note 162, 
at 521 (citing Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain 
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 533, 570–71 (1998)). 
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should apply a (dynamic) contextual approach to interpretation.191 
The next Section makes the argument. 
B. Dynamic Contextualist Interpretation 
A contextual approach is superior to a formalist approach when it 
comes to incomplete contracts.192 For formalism to work, the parties 
have to have put all of the important elements of their deal into the 
written document. Formalists argue that textualism is desirable 
because “[t]he greater the courts’ allegiance to the writing, the more 
careful will the parties be in drafting the written document.”193 To 
incentivize incomplete contracts, that argument can simply be flipped 
on its head. 
Contextualism allows the parties to purposely leave gaps in their 
contracts or use standard-like rather than rule-like language. Ideally, 
purposely incomplete drafting will lead to less litigation ex post. 
Flexible contracting can foster trust and collaboration, ultimately 
creating a more successful contracting relationship. If litigation does 
result, however, contextualism directs courts to discern the intent of 
the parties by looking to relevant evidence outside the four corners of 
the document. The hallmarks of contextualism are a weak indefinite-
ness doctrine and a weak parol evidence rule. A weak indefiniteness 
doctrine means that courts are willing to interpret or fill gaps in 
incomplete contracts rather than simply finding them unenforceable. 
A weak parol evidence rule means that courts are willing to consider a 
broader universe of evidence than simply what is in the four corners 
of the contract document. 
Contextualism facilitates flexible contracting because it allows 
parties to purposely leave gaps and know that, if necessary, a court 
will still enforce the contract. Leaving a gap in a contextualist regime 
“may provide a stronger assurance that parties will adhere to industry 
norms and will generally comport themselves in a good faith manner, 
lest evidence to the contrary be admitted in a dispute.”194 In general, 
the more evidence the court reviews, the more likely it is that the 
court will reach an accurate result. 
 
191.  Ben-Shahar, supra note 159, at 793 (“The greater the courts’ allegiance 
to the writing, the more careful will the parties be in drafting the 
written document.”). 
192. MITCHELL, supra note 167, at 238 (“[T]he broad hallmark of a 
commercial-expectations approach to contract legal reasoning is a form 
of contextualism . . . .”). 
193. Ben-Shahar, supra note 159, at 793–94; Id. (“The form of the bargain is 
not exogenous: rather, it is tailored in light of the weight that the courts 
will likely assign to it. The content of the text is endogenously 
determined by the courts’ willingness to peek beyond the text.”). 
194. Badawi, supra note 26, at 34. 
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But even the typical contextualist approach is still problematic. 
Contextualist courts use a weak parol evidence rule to evaluate 
extrinsic evidence for the purpose of discerning the intent of the 
parties at the time of contract formation.195 According to the 
traditional view of contracts, the “deal” is that which is made when 
the parties sign on the dotted line. Courts interpreting contracts 
therefore ask about the intent of the parties at that discrete point in 
time.  
The problem, however, is that the nature of the agreement 
between the parties is living, particularly with incomplete contracting. 
It evolves with time. Consider the example of contracting for inno-
vation. Apple and SCI entered into an incomplete contract in part 
because the product had not yet been designed. The parties could not 
have specified details ex ante. So a contract interpretation process 
that relies on discerning intent of the parties ex ante simply does not 
make sense.196 It sends a message to contracting parties that there is a 
premium on documenting the agreement at execution, whether it be 
in the contract document or in extrinsic evidence. In other words, 
while contextualism may not incentivize detailed drafting, it still 
incentivizes detailed ex ante agreement. Parties may just shift some of 
the cost from drafting the contract to documenting the agreement in 
other sources such as e-mail correspondence. Even with contextualist 
interpretation, the court is not asking the right question. This creates 
a high risk of error in court adjudication. 
William Eskridge Jr. addressed a related issue in his influential 
work Dynamic Statutory Interpretation.197 There he noted that 
statutory interpretation is static. Courts look to the language of a 
statute and legislative history to try to discern the intent of the 
legislature. The “intentionalist” approach asks how the legislature 
intended for the statute to be interpreted at the time it passed the 
law. This approach, according to Eskridge, is at odds with 
constitutional interpretation, which requires not just considering “the  
195. See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations 
Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5, 33 (2011) (“The main object of 
contract interpretation is to identify the intent of the drafting parties. 
As Lawrence Solan recently noted, the single concern of courts in 
interpretation cases ‘is to discover the intent of the parties, and reach a 
decision that will vindicate that intent.’”) (quoting Lawrence M. 
Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 388 
(2007)). 
196. See William C. Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 631, 634 (2004) (“[A]n agreement occurs in stages 
and performance commonly begins before the final stages of the 
agreement process, creating various problems not well accommodated by 
traditional contract doctrine.”). 
197. William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
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constitutional text and its historical background, but also its 
subsequent interpretational history, related constitutional develop-
ments, and current societal facts.”198 Eskridge suggests that statutory 
interpretation should be more like constitutional interpretation. He 
argues that statutory interpretation should be dynamic, not static. 
Courts should interpret statutes “in light of their present societal, 
political, and legal context.”199 
Eskridge’s reasoning is highly salient to the contract context. Like 
statutory interpretation, contract interpretation is focused for the 
most part at the time of contract execution.200 It is static. This is 
problematic for the type of contracting envisioned in this Article, 
where efforts are collaborative and innovative and the parties cannot 
entirely specify their deals ex ante. For these deals, contract 
interpretation, like constitutional interpretation (and according to 
Eskridge, statutory interpretation), should be dynamic. 
Melvin Eisenberg has started to outline the parameters of this 
argument.201 He suggests that there is a spectrum from static to 
dynamic in contract doctrine. A contract doctrine lies at the static 
pole if its application turns entirely on what occurred at the moment 
in time when a contract was formed. A contract law doctrine lies at 
the dynamic pole if its application turns in significant part on a 
moving stream of events that precedes, follows, or constitutes the for-
mation of a contract.202  
For purposefully incomplete contracts, the stream of events that 
follows formation will often be relevant to interpretation questions. In 
terms of incentives, dynamic contract interpretation doctrine would 
encourage parties to use flexible contracting techniques. It mitigates 
the risk that an incomplete contract will not be enforced and increases 
the likelihood that a court will come to an accurate conclusion. In 
addition, a dynamic approach encourages parties to act fairly toward 
each other during contract performance.203 Ultimately, although it is  
198. Id. at 1479. 
199. Id. 
200. See id. at 1479–80 (discussing the “originalist” approach to statutory 
interpretation). 
201. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1748–49 (2000). 
202. Id. at 1770 (“Contract interpretation must not only look at events 
before contract formation; it must also look at events after that time. 
Because contracts always evolve, or at least may always evolve, 
interpretation should take account of the way in which the parties live 
and grow their contracts.”). 
203. Eisenberg argues that contract law is moving in the direction of 
dynamic interpretation because the U.C.C. and Restatement allow 
courts to consider course of performance in interpretation issues. See id. 
(citing U.C.C. § 2-208(1)). However, course of performance usually 
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contract doctrine that would only be applied if litigation resulted, 
such an approach would also make litigation less likely. 
In sum, current contract law is too formalist, at least for this 
segment of contracts for which incomplete drafting is preferential. 
Formalist interpretation imposes costs on parties, forcing them to 
draft complete contracts. These costs are especially high for the types 
of contracts discussed in Part I.C. But the current method of context-
ualist interpretation is not far superior to formalism because like 
formalism, it forces the parties to come to ex ante agreement, whether 
or not they detail it in the contract. The better solution would be a 
dynamic, contextualist approach for the types of contracts that are 
the focus of this Article. This approach would increase the likelihood 
that courts will get the result right in litigation but, even more 
importantly, removes the doctrinal obstacle to purposefully 
incomplete contracting. 
C. Limitations 
There remain, however, a number of arguments against a 
dynamic, contextual approach to consider. First, critics will argue 
that such a system would mean high-cost litigation. Formalist inter-
pretation allows courts to consider the most limited evidentiary base, 
making litigation under a formalist regime the least costly. Context-
ualist interpretation is more costly than formalist interpretation 
because it requires review of a larger evidentiary base. Dynamic con-
textualism might be the most costly of all because it requires the 
largest evidentiary base given the expanded temporal reach of the 
interpretation question.  
It is true that dynamic contextualism might be the most costly, 
but it is also likely to be the most accurate.204 In addition, the 
 
comes up in a very specific and limited context. For instance, one 
company contracts to make five separate shipments of widgets and no 
place of delivery is specified. If the first three deliveries are made to 
buyer’s place of business (default rule would specify delivery at seller’s), 
delivery to buyer becomes a contract term through course of 
performance. In practice, however, courts rarely consider post-formation 
activities in contract interpretation matters. See, e.g., Corbin 
on Contracts: Interpretation of Contracts § 24.3 (Joseph M. 
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998) (“Through ‘interpretation’ of a contract, 
a court determines what meanings the parties, when contracting, gave to 
the language used.”) (emphasis added). 
204. Neoformalists Schwartz and Scott acknowledge the tradeoff between 
litigation cost and accuracy but argue that “[t]his tradeoff implies that 
risk neutral business parties will commonly prefer judicial 
interpretations to be made on a limited evidentiary base, the most 
important element of which is the contract itself.” Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 119, at 926; see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Daniel T. Ostas, 
Comparative Efficiency in International Sales Law, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 371, 403 (2011) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence that offers insight into the 
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prospect of costly litigation has a side benefit—it should bond parties 
not to seek litigation where issues can be resolved by other means.205 
A second concern is that a dynamic contextualist approach is at 
odds with the ideal of certainty. It is undoubtedly true that more 
highly specified contracts combined with formalist interpretation 
provide more certainty for the parties. But the type of contract most 
in need of flexible drafting methods is one in which there is inherent 
future uncertainty. In some sense, this problem is unavoidable.  
Third, if it is true that sophisticated parties prefer textualism, 
why have a law that is at odds with commercial preferences? But as 
stated earlier, parties preferring formalist interpretation can still 
specify as such in their agreements. The suggestion, here, is merely to 
change the default rule for a particular class of contracts. 
Finally, some may argue that changes in contract drafting must 
come from parties and not from changes in doctrine. And we have 
seen some party experimentation with flexible contracting. However, 
the combination of sociolegal and doctrinal deterrents makes an 
optimal level of experimentation unlikely to occur absent some 
change.  
Conclusion 
If the normative goal of contract law is to “facilitate the ability of 
firms to maximize welfare when making commercial contracts,”206 
current doctrine is out of step with this objective. Current doctrine 
assumes a model of contracting that is no longer commensurate with 
commercial realities. It assumes that incomplete or vague contracts 
result from laziness or errors and are always undesirable. Doctrine, 
therefore, is designed to encourage parties to specify their contracts. 
Detailed contracts are supposed to deter opportunism and make 
litigation less likely.  
But recent scholarship paints a much different picture. It 
demonstrates that in certain contexts, incomplete contracts are 
desirable. Less-specified contracts foster trust and collaboration and 
minimize cognitive problems that arise when parties strictly adhere to 
detailed requirements rather than focus on the larger purpose of the 
agreement. But there are both doctrinal and sociolegal deterrents to 
parties drafting purposely less-specified contracts, even when doing so 
would otherwise be efficient. 
 
parties’ true intentions provides the most efficient interpretation of 
contractual terms.”). 
205. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at 856 (listing alternatives to 
traditional litigation). 
206. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 116, at 556. 
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Formalist contract interpretation is designed to force parties to 
specify their deals ex ante. Contextualist interpretation is somewhat 
better, but the focus is still largely on the intent of the parties at 
contract execution. This is problematic for flexible contracting, where 
the goal is to have the parties’ deal evolve over time. This Article 
therefore suggests a more nuanced and dynamic approach to contract 
interpretation for a particular class of contracts, one that increases 
the likelihood that courts will reach an accurate conclusion but that 
also gives parties the right incentives to engage in flexible contracting. 
